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BOOK REVIEWS
THE ART OF ADvoCACY: A PLEA FOR THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TRIAL LAWYER.

By

Lloyd Paul Stryker. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953. Pp. 306. $5.00.
After Judge Arthur T. Vanderbilt's review of The Art of Advocacy in the New
York Times, March 28, 1954, any other must seem, at best, an anti-climax. That
review was complete and laudatory, and properly so. This book is a masterpiece
in exposition and a gem in inspiration.
Your reviewer must admit to some partiality toward and admiration for the
author. He has had the pleasure of participating in two trials against Mr. Stryker
and has been his beneficiary of some self-sacrificing acts of friendship.
This book states its theme in the sub-title, A Plea for the Renaissance of the
Trial Lawyer. Most of the arguments and illustrations are to prove: that we should
develop well-trained trial lawyers or barristers who will try all cases in our American courts; that other lawyers not trained in court litigation should be precluded
from trying court cases; and that trials would then be better and more expeditiously
handled and justice more easily attained.
Your reviewer disagrees with Mr. Stryker's super-emphasis on English justice
and methods. For one thing, England has not always pointed toward justice and
freedom, especially for the non-English. Secondly, your reviewer is not enthusiastic, to put it mildly, about the English method of witness interview and preparation by the solicitor; and trial by the barrister, with witnesses practically unseen
by him until the trial. I do agree with Mr. Stryker, however, that our system of
witness interview and preparation by the trial lawyer as soon as possible is the
better in gaining justice for the litigants.
Your reviewer also disagrees with the author's great admiration for English
judges and the policy of choosing solely from the list of barristers. Mr. Stryker
states, "Why are English judges so uniformly excellent?" Are they? He continues, "One reason must be that they are appointed from the roll of those who have
devoted a lifetime to the conduct of litigation in court-that is, from the barristers." And then, "A law teacher or writer would have as much chance of mounting
the bench as he would of becoming the chief surgeon of a great hospital." Now
Mr. Stryker, is it not true that many of our incompetent and some of our unfair
judges have come from the ranks of trial lawyers? Is it not also a fact that many
of our greatest judges, trial and appellate, have come from the ranks of law teachers and writers? Your reviewer, for one, wishes there were more scholars on
the bench.
Knowing the type, quality and names of many cases tried by Mr. Stryker in his
long and illustrious career, your reviewer feels that the author could have chosen
some greater trials of his own, not only as examples of his own masterpieces, but
also in place of the English illustrations he used.
Despite some of these disagreements your reviewer does admire the book. It is
inspirational to neophyte and veteran alike. The beautiful language and the zealous
arguments tend to sway the reader into the field of advocacy and to electrify the
veteran advocate to greater heights.
Now that your reviewer has gotten some of his mental operations concerning the
book off his chest it is a good time to describe and discuss its general contents.
The first chapter, "A New Case Arrives," describes the tedious work of interviewing witnesses and cients,--and thus mastering the facts. Contrary to most
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works on the subject this chapter reads as easily and as smoothly as a novel.
In the succeeding chapters, II-VI, Mr. Stryker takes us from entry into court
through the dosing speech. The reader can actually picture himself conducting
that "Bulwark of Liberty," and performing that "Incomparable Art"--Cross Examination, and then making the swaying, persuasive closing speech to the jury.
In the second part of the book Mr. Stryker tells us of the present low estate of
advocacy and of the great advocates of the past: Littleton, the Choates, Webster,
Jackson and others. He spends a chapter extolling the virtues of Martin IV. Littleton and the same space describing the ability of John W. Davis. Your reviewer
never saw Mr. Littleton; he saw and heard Mr. Davis, 'The Advocate'. Your reviewer cannot think of greater praise than in James M. Cox's Journty Through My
Years:
"If the Almighty ever created a finer man than John W. Davis, I never knew
him. He possessed every quality of statesmanship. On one occasion, he, Newton
D. Baker and I were speakers. In the midst of his admiration for Air. Davis's
speech, Mr. Baker said to me, 'If I knew I were to be born again, by some process
of reincarnation, and I were permitted to write out specifications for my future
being, I would ask to be given the legal mind of John IV. Davis."'
Part Three:-Good Advocacy -A Crying Need-develops the author's argument
for trained advocates in the criminal and appellate courts, and a divided bar. He
makes out an excellent case for his position that only trained advocates should be
permitted to try and argue cases in the courts. The last chapter of Part Three,
"The Ethics of Advocacy," is a dynamic reminder to lawyers and laymen alike
that under our Anglo-American system each accused, regardless of person or crime,
is entitled to a zealous, well-prepared, well-tried defense by competent trial lawyers; and that no advocate assigned to or retained by a disliked client, accused
of an unpopular crime should, in protecting the constitutional and legal rights of
the accused, be the subject of criticism or slander.
As the reader may have gathered, your reviewer feels that Mr. Stryker's The
Art of Advocacy is a great book; it is dramatic reading for the layman; and it is
instructional and inspirational to embryo and experienced trial lavyers alike. To
the embryo the advice is: read it once for enjoyment; then read it slowly and
carefully for instruction. At any rate, read it.
Manr PzrnoxI*

INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE: ACTIONs AND PLEADU;G AT C OsON L..
By Alison Reppy. Buffalo: Dennis & Co., Inc., 1954. Pp. xiv, 860. $3.50.
Pollock and Maitland in their History of English Law' say that to tell a piece
of history is to tear a seamless web. The same can be said of a study of the history
of almost any field of the law. It is especially true of an exploration of the whole
domain of common law procedure. In this field as in any other, continuity must be
the guide to understanding. We cannot comprehend the purpose or the effect of
statutory codes, even those compiled by master minds such as Bentham, Brougham
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1899) 1.
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or Field, merely by studying them as independent systems; we cannot grasp them
as newly-forged weapons any more than could Coke, as he was accused of attempting to do, 2 "rip uses up from their cradle." Our modem law of practice and procedure was born in the manorial courts, the hundred courts and the shire moots,
long before the Conquest, quite as much as in the Court of Common Bench; and
it traveled with the judges of Eyre on circuit in the reign of Henry I, before it
came to rest in Westminster Hall.
The admonition implicit in the famous dictum of Pollock and Maitland8 has
been faithfully observed by Dean Reppy in his Introduction to Civil Procedure,
dealing with actions and pleadings at common law. Only a scholar with the broadest perspective and the most profound knowledge could essay the task of surveying the whole range of common law procedure in England and the United States
and of integrating with the present the experience and learning of the past. In this
volume Dean Reppy has measured up to the task to which he has addressed a lifetime of painstaking industry in this branch of the law.
The book commences with a concisely portrayed panorama of the history of
the English judicial system, drawn against a rich background of deep historical
knowledge. Although the information is eclectically available in various other places,
its gathering into one place is of great value to the student. Underlying the historical treatment is the theme of the gradual evolution from the itinerant justices
into the centralized system of the growing common law jurisdiction. The historical
growth of this important phase is developed with a wealth of learning and illustration. There is a particularly illuminating exposition of the growth of the power of
the Chancellor into the Court of Chancery. There is also a skilful description of
the transition from customary law to common law and from common law to Chancery. The history of the system and growth of appellate courts is set forth simply
and clearly. More dates in this part of the book would be helpful to the neophyte.
There is more in this historical introduction than the student needs to know, but
this is not an objectionable feature. There is adequate although not extended treatment of the effect of the Consolidation Acts of 1873 and 1875.
The emphasis on the influence of the writ system, through the writings of Coke
and Blackstone, on the development of the Colonial Courts and the Courts of the
Justices of the Peace, is an important contribution. The great influence of the
Court of King's Bench on American judicial organization is adequately emphasized,
as, for example, in its assumption of jurisdiction over possessory actions as the
old real actions fell into disuse. The slowness with which the courts of some of the
colonies and states recognized the Chancery jurisdiction is explained in a novel
and illuminating light.
For a description of the Nature and Function of Pleading at Common Law, the
author draws on the First Report of the Royal Commission for improving the
system of pleading in the superior common law courts, issued in 1851, which states
in clear outline the groundwork of the English system of pleading, and points out
with admirable objectivity its merits and disadvantages. The discussion on Equity,
Modern Code Pleading, Modern Practice Acts and the Federal Rules of Civil ProChudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a (1594).
3. Maitland was understandably impressed with the feature of continuity. He expressed much the same thought earlier when, speaking of some of the great English
statutes, he said that "to pull them away without providing some substitute would be to
bring the whole fabric to confusion." Constitutional History of England 20 (1913).
2.
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cedure includes an admirable discussion of the distinction between actions at law
and suits in equity, with emphasis on their different modes of relief and modes of
trial. The doubtful usefulness of the New York Code of Civil Procedure in simplifying procedure is pointed out, and the skepticism substantiated by well-chosen
materials. The effect of the New Federal Rules is briefly discussed. The
author then proceeds to the vital problem of Fundamental Conceptions Common to all Procedural Systems. Here he surveys with the sure touch of the
master the influence of the Roman law prior to the fourteenth century, of
German procedural science and of canonical procedure. No doubt the compass of
the book precluded a detailed discussion of the German Reform Procedure of
1900, which Maitland regarded as a hundred years ahead of the English procedural
4
system.
Chapter II deals with the Commencement of an Action. The notes to this
chapter are copious and at the same time informative and carefully selected. Jurisdiction and venue are illustrated by cases of origin and of departure. The selectivity of illustration is characteristic of the selection of cases throughout the book.
There is a particularly penetrating discussion comparing the problem of jurisdiction in England and in the United States, leading up to the problem of Eric Railroad v. Tompkins. At page eighty-five there is given a form of original writ in
debt, which lightens considerably the strain on the student's imagination imposed by
the cases dealing with the historical substantive sequence from debt to contract
and the historical procedural sequence from writ to declaration. The problems confronting the pleader in stating a cause of action are then summarized.
The author has made an individual contribution to his subject by illustrating and
discussing the relationship between the considerations underlying bills of particulars
and the statement of facts required in declarations, first as required at common law
and then under modem Codes and Practice Acts. Here as throughout the work
the element of continuity and integration is stressed and demonstrated in a readily
understandable manner. The problem of stating a cause of action is next caught
up and illuminated by a comparison, by way of flash-back, in terms of the specific
common law actions, which is the subject of the Third Chapter. The method of
this chapter is to take up the traditional Tort Actions-trespass and case, trover,
ejectment, detinue and replevin-treating each action chronologically, from the point
of view of the history and form of the action, the plaintiff's right, title, interest or
possession, the alleged wrongful act of the defendant, and finally the status of the
action under Modem Codes and Practice Acts. Tort, with its predecessor form of
action in trespass, with illustrative declarations from actions in the King's Bench,
is followed by an historical note on actions on the case, and a comparison between
the traditionalist, modernist and revolutionary views. Here again the cases of origin,
such as the Innkeepers Case, are found rubbing shoulders, but not uncomfortably,
with the modem cases. Trespass and Case actions are illustrated by cases on the history and form of the action of trespass and on the case; the plaintiff's right, title, interest or possession in trespass and case; on case as the great residual remedy of
the common law, with particular applications, and on their status under Modem
Codes and Practice Acts. Trover, ejectment, detinue and replevin are treated in
order with similar discriminating evaluation, and as always with the beautifully articulated integration of ancient and modem procedure. An illustration is in the
section on the plaintiffs right, title, interest or possession, starting at page 254,
4. Maitland, The Making of the German Code, 3 Coll. Papers 474, 483 (1911).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

where the note material on the ancient real actions, comparing the defects in the
Real Actions with the advantages of the Action of Ejectment, gives a rich body
of source material for the study of the transition. The problem of Entry and
Ouster, and the imperative requirement, often overlooked, of the latter element at
common law, is illustrated with a wealth of discriminately selected English cases of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the significant cases under
Modem Codes and Practice Acts.
The history and form of the Action of Detinue is introduced by a sufficiently
comprehensive extract from Dean Ames' essay in his Lectures on Legal History,
illustrated by cases from the Year Books. This material is followed by sample
writs, declarations and judgments in detinue, and finally, marshalled in orderly
sequence, by the modem cases, at common law and under Modem Codes and Practice Acts.
The second part of the chapter on Stating the Cause of Action deals with Con.
tract Actions; Debt, Covenant, Account and Special and General Assumpsit. Here the
method is to discuss under each action its history and form, its nature, and its status
under Modem Codes and Practice Acts. This has been done with the same painstaking attention to early precedents, both common law and statutory, and a skillfully
manipulated transition to modem cases and statutes. As in the treatment of the
Tort Actions, copies of original writs and declarations are inserted to make more
readily understandable the origin of the rules and therefore their modem offspring.
There is, on page 489, a useful diagram of the Common Counts, with comments on
their origin ranging from Ames to contemporaneous Law Review discussion.
Part IV, Defensive Pleadings, starts with a chapter on demurrers. From a treatment of general and special demurrers and a discussion of the effect of demurrer
the author proceeds, with a characteristic wealth of illustrative cases, to demurrer
and corresponding motions under the Codes and Practice Acts. Chapter V deals
with Pleas, first from a general approach to pleas in abatement and in bar, through
the Common or Specific Traverse and the Special Traverse to the General Issue
and Pleas in Confession and Avoidance, with appropriately selected forms applicable to particular forms of action. The material in this part is especially rich and
pertinent.
Chapter VI deals with Replications de Injuria and Departure; Chapter VII with
motions on the pleadings; Chapter VIII with the Judgment and its Effect, including
the problems of collateral attack and res judicata, and execution. Chapter IX
deals with Appellate Review, from the writ of error through the Bill of Exceptions
to Status under Modem Codes and Practice Acts. The Appendix, characteristic of
the author's learning and antiquarian instincts, gives the record in Slade's Case
and the Hilary Rules of 1833.
We have here a work which reflects no mere growing perception of the problems
involved, but a superbly mature survey of common law actions and pleading. There
is little in this field which the book leaves unexplored. It is necessarily left to special
works to explore topics such as equity pleading, interpleader and the Federal Rules
of Practice. This is perfectly consistent with the author's view that the subject
of procedure cannot be compressed into one course, but must be approached with
adequate emphasis on its background and history. The author has created a unified
and integrated history of common law procedure, emphasizing the continuity and
evolution of this branch of the law. Clearly the book has a twofold objective: to
enable the student to obtain an understanding of the modem system of code pleading and practice, and to facilitate the accomplishment of this objective through
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acquainting him with the philosophy of procedure. To understand the modem practice as craftsman rather than as mere artisan, one must understand its origins.
This dual objective has been accomplished, it would seem to this reviewer, to the
limit of one-volume capacity. The book should prove to be an admirable teaching tool and of great value to anyone who seeks to attain a thorough mastery of
the tools of the craft of the practice of law. The book, the culmination of a lifetime of study, teaching and reflection in the field of common law pleading and
procedure, is a definite contribution to our learning in this branch of the law, well
worthy of standing cover to cover with Stephen, Chitty and other masters of the
field.

RALPH A. Nnwu&,rAt
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.

